This paper defends Nagelian reduction in cognitive science by combining empirical neuroscience research with philosophical debates. I argued that, despite criticisms, Nagel’s model can provide valid explanations for cognitive science phenomena when moderated. Using the mental imagery debate as a case study, the paper demonstrates that both pictorialist and descriptivist views employ different bridge laws and assumptions, illustrating Nagelian reduction. The paper addresses methodological and applicational issues, proposing that allowing approximations and using diverse formal systems can resolve these challenges. I concluded that a moderated Nagelian model can effectively describe intertheoretical reductions in cognitive science

This research proposal focuses on investigating the relationship between episodic memory and mental imagery, particularly in individuals with aphantasia, who cannot form mental images. The study aims to develop a dual-process theory of mental imagery, exploring how fast and slow cognitive processes interact in forming and manipulating mental images, and how this interaction is affected by the absence of conscious mental imagery. The project hopes to employ interdisciplinary methods, including behavioral experiments, neuroimaging, and philosophical theories, to fill gaps in the current understanding of episodic memory and its mechanisms. The expected outcome is to provide new insights into the neural processes underlying mental imagery and episodic memory, with potential implications for understanding memory-related disorders and improving AI systems.